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The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to an increase in cyberattacks and cybercrime, 
particularly with respect to phishing attempts. Cybercrime associated with phishing emails can 
significantly impact victims, who may be subjected to monetary loss and identity theft. Existing anti-
phishing tools do not always catch all phishing emails, leaving the user to decide the legitimacy of 
an email. The ability of machine learning technology to identify reoccurring patterns yet cope with 
overall changes complements the nature of anti-phishing techniques, as phishing attacks may vary 
in wording but often follow similar patterns. This paper presents a browser extension called 
MailTrout, which incorporates machine learning within a usable security tool to assist users in 
detecting phishing emails. MailTrout demonstrated high levels of accuracy when detecting phishing 
emails and high levels of usability for end-users. 
Phishing. Usable Security. Machine Learning. Browser Extension. Socio-Technical Security. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Phishing emails generally attempt to persuade the 
recipient to reveal private or confidential information 
such as passwords or bank details and may deliver 
malware to infect the victim’s machine. Information 
gained via phishing emails is used for fraudulent 
purposes by the sender, placing users at risk of 
identity theft, fraud, and significant financial loss. 
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
incidences of cyberattacks and cybercrime have 
increased considerably, including a sharp rise in 
phishing attempts (Lallie et al., 2021; Horgan et al., 
2021). The pandemic has caused a fundamental 
shift in working practices and social interactions, 
creating an enhanced dependence on technology. 
Thus, users require additional support to identify 
potentially malicious emails. 
Successful phishing scams can be costly for victims; 
in the UK, it is estimated that it takes 20 days and 
£960,000 to address the consequences of a single 
phishing or social engineering attack (Graham, 
2018).  
To combat phishing attempts, email clients make 
use of spam filters to quarantine suspicious emails. 
However, these filters are not always successful; 
consequently, users require additional assistance to 
help them detect phishing emails in the form of anti-
phishing tools and security education. 
Anti-phishing tools may take the form of browser 
extensions, which can augment the users’ browsing 
experience. These tools can identify different forms 
of phishing attacks; ‘GoldPhish’ is an Internet 
Explorer extension used to identify phishing 
webpages (Dunlop et al., 2010), while ‘PhishAri’ is a 
Google Chrome extension designed to detect 
phishing attempts on Twitter (Aggarwal et al., 2012). 
Anti-phishing tools may also make use of machine 
learning (ML), allowing systems to learn from 
existing data to make decisions without the need for 
human interaction. Previous work by Fette et al. 
(2007) was able to detect phishing emails based on 
features such as the number of hyperlinks present 
and the use of JavaScript. 
This paper presents a prototype browser extension 
to detect phishing emails, which harnesses the 
power of machine learning to assist users in 
identifying phishing attempts, protecting them from 
becoming a victim of cybercrime. 
TensorFlow was used to develop and train an ML 
model using a dataset of fraudulent and legitimate 
emails. The model was evaluated for accuracy and 
converted for use in a prototype Google Chrome 
browser extension. The extension parses email text 
and evaluates sentiment and language to determine 
legitimacy. The extension was also tested with 
participants to evaluate its usability. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; 
Section 2 explores related work in phishing 
detection and machine learning. Section 3 describes 
the methodology. Results are presented in Section 
4 and are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents 
conclusions and considers future work. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1 Existing anti-phishing tools 
Phishing emails are not a new problem; however, 
attempts have increased in the wake of the COVID-
19 pandemic attempts (Lallie et al., 2021). Usable 
security research has investigated anti-phishing 
security tools to protect users and increase the 
awareness of risks associated with phishing 
attempts.  
A vital consideration when developing security tools 
– especially those aimed at non-technical individuals 
– is ensuring that they are accessible and user-
friendly. Kumaraguru et al. (2010) developed two 
anti-phishing tools: the embedded email-based 
‘PhishGuru’ and the online game ‘Anti-Phishing 
Phil’. To ensure the tools provided effective 
education, the developers followed a series of 
design principles, including ‘learning-by-doing’, 
which states that people learn better when they 
practice their skills. In PhishGuru, instructional 
materials are embedded into the user’s everyday 
tasks, such as checking their emails. Implanting the 
materials increases the prevalence of ‘teachable 
moments’ – optimal opportunities to convey a point 
or idea – increasing the tool’s educational potential.  
Other embedded tools may take the form of browser 
extensions. GoldPhish, developed by Dunlop et al. 
(2010), was an extension for the now deprecated 
Internet Explorer browser, allowing it to easily 
access the sites viewed by the user to identify 
phishing (Dunlop et al., 2010). 
Aggarwal, et al. (2012) developed ‘PhishAri’, a 
Chrome browser extension used to detect phishing 
attempts on Twitter. The researchers found that 
phishing attacks carried out through social media 
sites have risen, and a common technique used is 
the obfuscation of malicious web links through URL 
shortening. The extension uses ML techniques to 
classify phishing URLs and tweets through 
characteristics of the URL, the tweet, and the author. 
The tool applies a red indicator to phishing tweets 
and a green indicator to safe tweets. 
2.2 Machine Learning (ML) 
The language patterns commonly reused in phishing 
attacks have generated interest in how machine 
learning can identify and protect users from phishing 
attacks due to its ability to classify data by identifying 
trends. 
ML models require input data stored in a numerical 
format for processing. Data can come from a variety 
of sources, including images and text converted to 
numerical vectors. In the field of natural language 
processing (NLP), structured collections of text 
referred to as ‘corpora’ are used as datasets for 
training. Converted data can make predictions on 
non-numerical information, using qualities such as 
its visual appearance or use of language. 
Fu et al. (2006) proposed a method for detecting 
phishing webpages by assessing the visual 
similarities between a potential phishing site and a 
set of protected sites known to be legitimate. The 
research interpreted the colour and location of each 
pixel on a webpage as data used when making a 
prediction. However, this method only detects 
phishing pages that look similar to those in the 
protected set, with less success at detecting 
phishing web pages outside of this set. Fu et al. 
(2006) cited using natural language analysis to 
enhance the project, improving detection accuracy. 
The GoldPhish browser extension by Dunlop et al. 
(2010) uses optical character recognition (OCR) to 
detect a company logo on a webpage and converts 
it to text.  Google PageRank is then used to compare 
the top domains with that name to the current 
webpage. However, one potential issue with this 
method is that webpage logos may be highly 
stylised, rendering them difficult for OCR to interpret.  
The aforementioned research has explored phishing 
webpages, which contain more graphical content 
than phishing emails. Image-based phishing 
detection is less flexible than text-based detection. It 
is only able to detect images similar to those used 
during model training and is dependent on the 
accuracy of external technologies, such as OCR 
software. Thus, it is essential to focus on the text 
content using sentiment analysis, which has been 
applied to other contexts. 
Tao and Fang (2020) proposed a multi-label 
sentiment analysis method to determine the 
sentiment of online reviews for restaurants, wines 
and films. This method allows the sentiment towards 
specific aspects of a sample to be analysed, rather 
than producing a prediction for the overall sentiment. 
For example, a review for a restaurant may express 
a positive sentiment towards the food but a negative 
sentiment towards the atmosphere. 
While emails may contain some common features, 
such as greetings and sign-offs, these are not 
present in all emails. Also, compared to descriptions 
of specific features of an object, such as a wine’s 
variety or country of origin, these email features are 
more abstract and may be more difficult for an ML 
model to identify. However, this method used a 
multi-class approach, allowing samples to be 
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classified as positive, negative, neutral or conflicted 
(both positive and negative). Such an approach may 
be applicable when identifying phishing emails, as it 
may produce more accurate results, considering 
different types of phishing attempts. 
Other important factors to consider relating to the 
dataset used in training are its quality, size, and 
format. Halgaš et al. (2019) proposed a phishing 
classifier that uses a recurrent neural network (RNN) 
to evaluate an email’s text and structure. 
Researchers highlighted the ability of phishing 
emails to avoid filters due to their changing nature 
and suggest that ML may be able to identify trends 
in phishing emails. Two datasets comprised of 
legitimate and phishing emails sourced from existing 
email corpora were used to train the model. Of the 
two datasets used, the RNN classified emails more 
accurately when trained with the smaller and less 
balanced of the two datasets, demonstrating that 
both quantity and quality of a corpus impact a 
model’s accuracy. This method classified emails as 
either ‘ham’ (legitimate) or phishing. However, this 
binary classification system may have impacted the 
model’s accuracy, given the many differences in 
language used in the numerous types of phishing 
attacks, such as extortion compared to unexpected 
money fraud. 
Prusa et al. (2015) investigated the correlation 
between the size of a training dataset and the 
accuracy of a sentiment analysis classifier, explicitly 
studying the number of instances required to train a 
tweet sentiment classifier. The researchers found 
that as the size of the dataset used for training 
increased, the accuracy of the machine learning 
model improved. However, there was no significant 
improvement in the accuracy of this classifier after 
the use of a dataset containing 81,000 instances. 
The sentiments of tweets were classified as either 
positive or negative, which are very general terms 
(Prusa et al., 2015).  
2.3 Machine learning and anti-phishing tools 
ML techniques could be applied to the field of 
usable security. Given the increased need for 
usable, anti-phishing tools and the ability of ML to 
detect patterns in data, this highlights the potential 
for these research areas to be combined, thus 
protecting users and enhancing phishing detection. 
In the following section, the methodology behind 
the research is outlined, explaining how an ML 
model was integrated into an anti-phishing browser 
extension to support end-users. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
An ML model was trained to classify emails as 
phishing or legitimate and was designed to produce 
a classification prediction based on an email’s text 
contents. The browser extension operated by 
reading and processing selected text to generate an 
output in a popup window.    
The browser extension and the ML model were 
integrated into a single extension named MailTrout 
(Figure 1). The browser extension selected and read 
text from the browser window and converted the text 
into a numerical sequence for processing. The ML 
model then generated a prediction based on the 
sequence. Finally, the browser extension displayed 
an output based on the prediction of the ML model. 
 
Figure 1: Components within MailTrout  
3.1 Machine learning model 
The ML model was developed using Python 3, the 
Python deep-learning library Keras (Chollet, 2015) 
and the open-source ML library, TensorFlow 
(Google, 2020a). 
3.1.1. Algorithm selection 
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are computational 
algorithms based on the model of biological neurons 
in the human brain. ANNs can be used in ML to 
process input data and produce an output, such as 
a classification or prediction (Chen et al., 2019). 
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) are variants of 
ANNs. The results of previous items in a sequence 
– such as words in a text – are stored to provide 
contextual information and produce results based on 
both the current and previous input. This method is 
ideal for NLP as it can evaluate the sentiment of text 
overall by evaluating words individually as well as in 
their context by considering the impact of the 
previous text (Lai et al., 2015).   
Long Short-Term Memory networks (LSTMs) are an 
RNN architecture designed to cope with long-range 
dependences. As the distance between previous 
information and present input data grows, traditional 
RNNs become less effective at connecting this 
information to apply context. However, LSTMs are 
more capable of learning long-term dependencies, 
as they use multiple neural network layers to pass 
the neuron’s output value and a memory cell state 
along the network, providing contextual information 
that can influence the output value at each stage. 
Due to this technique, LSTMs are shown to 
outperform standard RNNs at learning context-free 
and context-sensitive language (Gers & 
Schmidhuber, 2001; Sak et al., 2014).  
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Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory networks 
(BLSTMs) further improve the ability to learn long-
term dependencies.  BLSTMs operate on the input 
sequence from both directions, allowing the 
network to incorporate context from before and 
after the present item in a sequence. This method 
has proven to be powerful in tasks involving NLP, 
including sentiment analysis and classification 
(Wang, et al., 2015). For these reasons, the ML 
model was designed to use a BLSTM layer to 
process data. 
3.1.2. Classification 
Binary-class models allow data to be classified as 
one of two categories, typically ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’. While this approach could be applied in 
this research, the issue of the many differences in 
phishing email patterns and vectors had to be 
considered. Avanan’s Global Phish Report (2019) 
classified the phishing emails reviewed into four 
vectors: spearphishing, extortion, credential 
harvesting and malware phishing.  
Spearphishing attacks - phishing targeted at a 
specific individual, such as a high-level employee in 
an organisation - were commonly found to 
impersonate senior employees such as CEOs. 
Spearphishing uses social engineering to urge their 
victim to complete a task, such as granting the 
attacker access to company information or finances. 
This form of attack is known as business email 
compromise. 
Extortion attacks use threats to pressure their victim, 
e.g. threatening to share compromising information, 
holding them to a cryptocurrency-based ransom. 
These emails often use email spoofing techniques 
and passwords uncovered from data leaks to add 
credibility to their claims. 
Credential harvesting attacks aim to steal sensitive 
information from their victims, such as passwords or 
bank details. These attacks commonly impersonate 
trusted brands and lead the victims to phishing 
webpages, using social engineering to create a 
sense of urgency.  
Malware phishing attempts seek to install harmful 
software on a victim’s device. These exhibit 
characteristics similar to the aforementioned 
attacks. 
Postolache and Postolache (2010) also identified 
numerous phishing vectors, including extortion and 
the impersonation of legitimate organisations and 
individuals. However, they also identified numerous 
vectors not covered by these terms, including 
advance-fee, lottery and investment fraud. These 
are examples of unexpected money and winnings 
scams, in which a scammer attempts to make a 
victim believe that they can receive a financial or 
material reward by following their instructions, such 
as by sharing their bank details or paying an upfront 
fee (Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commision, 2015).  These investigations highlight 
the broad range of phishing email vectors in use and 
pose an issue for an ML model; as classification 
predictions are most accurate when items of a class 
have more similarities, a model’s accuracy may be 
hindered by large differences in the data. 
To reduce issues with accuracy, a multi-class 
approach was chosen for the ML model, in which 
text could either be classified as legitimate (HAM) or 
one of four classes of phishing: impersonation 
phishing (IMP), business email compromise (BEC), 
extortion (EXT) or unexpected money/winnings 
scams (UNX). This method ensured that data used 
for training could be sorted into classes of as little 
variance as possible.  The approach would help to 
ensure the ML model’s accuracy, allowing the 
finished product to produce information specifically 
relevant to the type of phishing email that the user 
had likely received.  
Finally, the ML model used the softmax function to 
output results as a probability distribution. Softmax 
normalises output by converting a vector of numbers 
to values between 0 and 1 that have a sum of 1, 
allowing each result to be interpreted as a probability 
(Goodfellow et al., 2016). This approach allows the 
model to output the certainty of its result, which may 
be helpful to a user when considering if they should 
follow the actions recommended by the browser 
extension in response to an email message they 
have received.  
3.1.3. Datasets 
The Fraud Email Dataset published by Verma 
(2018) was included in the final dataset used to train 
the ML model. Verma’s dataset contains fraud 
emails described as ‘Nigerian fraud’ (advance-fee 
scam) taken from the CLAIR collection of fraud email 
(Radev, 2008), and legitimate emails taken from the 
dataset of Hillary Clinton’s emails released by the 
US Department of State (Kaggle, 2019).  
Verma’s dataset was chosen as it did not require 
much formatting or review; the data did not contain 
any email header information, only the body content, 
which the ML model was designed to process. Also, 
all items were labelled as either fraud (1) or 
legitimate (0), allowing for easy relabelling to UNX 
and HAM respectively, for, compatibility with the ML 
model’s multi-class system.  Additionally, the Python 
Reddit API Wrapper (PRAW) was used to collect 
extortion phishing emails posted on a series of 
Reddit threads titled “The Blackmail Email Scam” 
(EugeneBYMCMB, 2019). Suitable entries were 
labelled as EXT and added to the final dataset.  
Online records of phishing emails are commonly in 
the format of screenshots rather than plaintext 
copies. In response to this, a script was developed 
to use OCR technology to read and store the text of 
saved images of emails. The Python script ‘Google 
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Images Download’ was used to download results of 
online image searches for examples of phishing 
emails. This script allowed for multiple prefix and 
suffix terms to be added to a keyword for individual 
searches. The approach allowed for greater 
automation of image acquisition by appending 
names of well-known banks and commerce 
platforms to a search of “impersonation phishing 
email”. The script also allowed for colour filters to be 
applied to searches, which was used to specify 
black-and-white images for forms of phishing that 
were unlikely to include colours or images (Vasa, 
2019).   
The image results required manual review as many 
were not suitable, including infographics and images 
on the subject of email phishing. The suitable 
images were then compiled into folders manually, 
separated by their classifications. The free OCR 
engine Tesseract was used to interpret the text from 
the images (Google 2020b). The Python wrapper 
tool PyTesseract was used to include Tesseract as 
part of a Python script (Lee, 2020). 
All emails (Table 1) were compiled into one large 
CSV file. 
Table 1: Different types of phishing email in the dataset. 
Email Category  Count  
Business Email Compromise (BEC)  391  
Extortion (EXT)  1427  
Legitimate (HAM)  5287  
Impersonation (IMP)  541  
Unexpected Money/Winnings (UNX)  3581  
Grand Total  11227  
 
3.1.4. Training 
The email text from the dataset was split into 
portions for training and validation of 80% and 20%, 
respectively, following the commonly used Pareto 
Principle (McRay, 2015).  
High-frequency words that consume processing 
time but do not contribute to sentiment were filtered 
from the dataset. These words are known as stop 
words. The Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) is a 
Python library used for NLP and includes a corpus 
of stop words, including “the”, “a”, and “also” (Bird et 
al., 2009). This corpus was used as part of the ML 
training script to find and remove all stop words 
present in the training data.  
Words in the dataset were converted to integers 
using a tokenizer, which converts text into 
meaningful data or ‘tokens’. The tokenizer used was 
included in the Keras Python library and was created 
using the 10,000 most reoccurring words in the 
dataset vocabulary. The tokenizer was exported as 
a JSON file so that it could be used later. Both the 
training and validation sequences were tokenized, 
and a separate tokenizer was used to convert the 
data labels to integers (Google, 2020c).  
The sequences used to train the model had to be 
equal in size, meaning that sequences had to be 
padded or truncated to fit a set length. Sequence 
padding involves adding zeros to a sequence until it 
is the desired length. This can be done from the 
beginning (pre-padding) or the end (post-padding. 
The sequences were pre-padded, as this method 
has been shown to produce the most accurate 
results when used with an LSTM model 
(Dwarampudi & Reddy, 2019).  
The standard sequence length chosen was 500 
words. The mean word count of the emails used in 
training was 201, and the standard deviation 
approximately 266. The sequence length was 
calculated as the mean plus one standard deviation 
rounded to the nearest hundred. On inspecting the 
distribution of word counts of the emails, it was 
confirmed that this length was suitable, as most 
emails were within this range.   Emails with a word 
count greater than 500 were truncated. Truncation 
can be carried out from the beginning (pre-
truncation) or the end (post-truncation) of the 
sequence. There is no widely accepted best practice 
for sequence truncation for LSTMs; therefore, post-
truncation was used to avoid removing keywords or 
phrases commonly located near the beginning of 
phishing emails, e.g. “Dear Customer”. 
3.2 Web browser extension 
The browser extension was designed to help the 
user classify an email as legitimate or phishing, 
using the ML model. The extension was developed 
for use in Google Chrome, which has the largest 
share (StatCounter, 2021). 
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the browser extension. 
The browser extension uses a complementary 
colour palette of turquoise and gold, ensuring that 
text and buttons are high contrast and easy to 
distinguish visually. The extension also uses green 
and red icons to highlight what the user should and 
should not do in response to receiving a potential 
phishing email. Green is commonly associated with 
safety, while red is associated with danger. The 
extension uses this recognisable colour scheme to 
make the meaning of its messages clear. 
Screenshots of the prototype were tested using 
‘Coblis’, an online tool that allows the user to view 
an uploaded image as a person would see it with a 
colour vision deficiency (CVD) or colour-blindness 
(Wickline, 2001). 
3.2.1. Implementation 
In order to select an email to be evaluated by the 
extension, the user highlights text using their cursor 
and then selects a button on the extension popup. 
This method was deemed the most transferable for 
use in different web email clients as it did not 
require email contents to be automatically detected, 
ensuring that the extension processed only the text 
a user wanted to evaluate. The extension popup 
displays on the right side of the page; this is 
common practice for web browser extensions and 
would be familiar to the user. This also prevents 
disruption to the user’s browsing experience; given 
that the user is likely to have left-aligned text on a 
page, the popup will not cover any important parts 
of the text. 
3.2.2. Readability 
To ensure that users could easily understand the 
instructions, certainty of classification, and 
information given by the extension, the Python 
package ‘TextStat’ was used to evaluate the 
readability and complexity of the text in the 
extension’s instructions and results (Bansal & 
Aggarwal, 2020).  
TextStat can be used to produce a readability score 
using numerous established readability formulas. 
The Dale-Chall readability formula was used to 
calculate the US grade level of text, which was then 
used to determine the average age level. According 
to Begeny and Greene (2014), the Dale-Chall 
formula outperforms other commonly used 
readability formulas as a consistent and accurate 
indicator of text difficulty. Text within the extension 
was written to be understandable by those aged 18 
majority – the legally recognised threshold of 
adulthood – in most countries (UN General 
Assembly, 1989). 
3.3 Integration of model into extension 
The ML model was converted from a Hierarchical 
Data Format Files to the TensorFlow.js Layers 
format, allowing for use with JavaScript as part of 
the web browser extension. The Layers formatted 
model consisted of a JSON file of the model 
architecture and a binary weights file. The JSON 
file was loaded into JavaScript using 
TensorFlow.js, allowing the browser extension to 
make and output predictions using the ML model. 
The browser extension was designed to use the ML 
model to make classifications on the client-side. 
This approach ensured the analysis of emails 
would be faster compared to loading the model 
from a server (Figure 3). The model was loaded 
from the JSON file stored by the extension and 
generated a prediction based on the sequence. 
The prediction consisted of an array of probabilities 
that the sequence was one of the potential email 
categories. The browser extension then displayed a 
result based on the classification with the highest 
probability.  
 
Figure 3: System architecture. 
3.4 User testing 
User acceptance testing was carried out to evaluate 
the browser extension’s usability. Testing was 
conducted remotely owing to the COVID-19 
pandemic and restrictions regarding in-person 
experiments. Participants emailed the researchers 
indicating interest and were provided with a copy of 
the extension, along with an instructional YouTube 
video containing installation details. 
An online survey used to record participants’ 
feedback on the extension’s usability was 
developed.  Participants had to agree to an informed 
consent statement before proceeding with the 
experiment and were asked to provide demographic 
information.  Participants were also asked about 
their familiarity with the terms used to describe the 
four categories of phishing emails. They were then 
given a fuller description of each category and asked 
to rate how likely they would be to identify an email 
of that category. 
A scenario was given to participants to add a level 
of realism to the testing environment. This scenario 
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stated that the participant was working for an 
organisation and had been asked to review their 
boss’s email inbox using the MailTrout extension to 
identify phishing emails received.  
A webmail-style sandbox environment created using 
HTML, CSS, JavaScript, and PHP was developed 
and displayed to participants in the browser. The 
inbox randomly selected 10 test emails out of a 
possible 30 and displayed these to the participant 
one at a time, moving to the next email once the 
participant marked each as either legitimate or 
phishing. Once they completed the task, they were 
asked to consider how usable they found the 
extension, using an all-positive version of the 
System Usability Scale (SUS) as discussed by 
Sauro & Lewis (2011). 
After using the extension, participants were again 
asked how likely they would be to identify phishing 
emails of each category.  Additional questions 
explored how helpful they found the instructions 
provided for using the extension and how likely they 
would be to recommend the extension to someone 
looking to protect themselves against phishing 
emails. Participants were also asked to provide 
feedback on how the extension catered to any 
conditions they had which may impact their ability to 
use a browser extension, such as a specific learning 
difficulty (SpLD), CVD, or visual impairment. 
Participants were also given the opportunity to 
provide any other feedback they had about the 
extension overall.  
4. RESULTS 
Results showed that overall, the ML model classified 
emails accurately, and test participants were content 
with the usability of the extension. Additionally, they 
found it simple to use and felt it educated them on 
the techniques commonly used in phishing emails. 
4.1 Model accuracy 
The model was trained with a sequence size of 500 
words, using pre-padding and post-truncation to 
reach this standard size. The size of 500 words was 
chosen because the majority of emails in the dataset 
fell within this range. Overall, the dataset contained 
11227 records.  
The model produced: 5930 true positives (TPs), 
5287 true negative (TNs), 0 false positives (FPs), 
and 10 false negatives (FNs). The true categories of 
emails were recorded when counting FNs to 
understand the model’s accuracy when classifying 
categories of phishing emails (Table 2).   
Table 2: Total number of emails in the dataset and FNs. 
Email Category  Total No. of FNs  
Unexpected 
Money/Winnings (UNX)  
3581  0  
Extortion (EXT)  1427  0  
Impersonation (IMP)  541  7  
Business Email 
Compromise (BEC)  
391  3  
4.2 User acceptance 
To evaluate the usability of the extension, 44 
participants (23 male, 21 female) over the age of 18 
years were recruited for the pilot study. Participants 
ranged in age from 18-69 (with 59% falling into the 
18-24 bracket), and varied in level of education, field 
of study, and country of residence. 
Overall, participants’ answers to the SUS 
questionnaire gave the MailTrout extension a score 
of 87.5 out of 100.   Notably, younger participants 
gave the extension a higher usability rating than 
older participants. Only one participant reported 
being in the age range of 40-54. The two highest age 
ranges (40-54 and 55-69) were combined into one 
range of 40-69 to aid in presenting and interpreting 
the results. Participants aged 18-24 gave the 
extension the highest usability score on average, 
while those aged 40-69 gave the extension the 
lowest usability score. While the ratings received 
overall were positive, these findings demonstrate 
that older participants may have found the tool less 
usable (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: SUS score by age bracket. 
Many participants remarked on how easy they found 
the extension to use and understand, describing it 
as refined and straightforward. Participants also 
found the speed and ability of the extension 
impressive. A common view among participants was 
that the extension was well designed, and the text 
was easy to read and understand.  
Several participants expressed that the extension 
would be helpful to those who are less confident 
online and perhaps more vulnerable to phishing 
emails, such as the elderly. Another emerging theme 
was that participants said they would recommend 
MailTrout to people they knew who commonly 
receive phishing emails. Overall, participants felt 
they would be very likely to recommend the 
extension to someone looking to protect themselves 
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against phishing emails, scoring their likelihood an 
average of 4.59 out of 5.  
Before testing the extension, users were asked to 
rate their familiarity with terms describing the types 
of phishing emails. They were then given a 
description of each category and asked to rate the 
likelihood that they would be able to identify an email 
of each category. After using the extension, they 
were asked to rate the likelihood again, exploring if 
their level of understanding increased.  Results 
showed that participants understanding of phishing 
emails and the associated categories improved 
post-test. 
Some participants raised issues with the extension’s 
functionality. Some reported that the result produced 
was more accurate if more text was selected for 
analysis. Therefore, users could receive less 
accurate results if they omitted some words when 
highlighting an email’s text. Participants also 
expressed issues with interaction, notably the need 
to highlight text and click the extension icon. Others 
argued the extension often flagged emails as 
phishing where there were no typical characteristics 
of phishing attacks present in the text, such as 
requests for information or money or when the email 
appeared to have been sent by a trusted individual.  
The results of the user testing were recorded to 
evaluate the accuracy of participants’ classification 
of emails either as legitimate or phishing. These 
results are displayed as a confusion matrix – a table 
of the number of correct and incorrect predictions 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Confusion matrix of participant classifications. 
The specific categories of phishing emails were also 
recorded to determine the number of phishing 
emails erroneously marked legitimate (false 
negatives), as shown in Table 3. These results 
showed that BEC emails had the largest number of 
FNs, suggesting they may have been the category 
detected with the least accuracy. 
Table 3: FNs per category during user testing 







124  1  
Extortion (EXT)  97  1  
Impersonation (IMP)  143  5  
Business Email Compromise 
(BEC)  
178  31  
5. DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the accuracy and success of 
the ML model used by MailTrout and the usability 
and functionality of the integrated solution as a 
security tool. 
5.1 Model 
Using the FP and FN rates of PILFER and 
SpamAssassin as shown in Table 1 (Fette et al., 
2007), categories were devised to rank the success 
of the ML model.  
Table 4: Categories of ML Model FP and FN Rates. 
 
 
Figure 6: Formulae for false positive (FP) and false 
negative (FN) rates. 
Using the formula shown in Figure 6, the FP of the 
MailTrout model was 0.0, with an FN of 0.00168, 
demonstrating the model's accuracy. 
In comparison to existing research, the model 
outperformed other ML-based phishing detection 
methods. As shown in Table 4, the email classifier 
PILFER combined with a feature using the spam 
filter SpamAssassin developed by Fette et al. (2007) 
had an FP rate of 0.0013 and an FN rate of 0.036, 
while the trained SpamAssassin filter alone had an 
FP rate of 0.0012 and an FN rate of 0.130. The most 
accurate RNN phishing classifier developed by 
Halgaš et al. (2019) had FP and FN rates of 0.0126 
and 0.0147, respectively. 
However, these findings are somewhat limited by 
issues with the dataset. Firstly, due to the lack of 
data available, 80% of emails from the same dataset 
were used for training, with 20% for testing, following 
Category  False Positive 
(FP) Rates  
False Negative (FN) 
Rates  
‘Excellent’  ≤ 0.0012  ≤ 0.036  
‘Good’  > 0.0012, ≤ 
0.00135  
> 0.036, ≤ 0.0715  
‘Average’  > 0.00135, ≤ 
0.0022  
> 0.0715, ≤ 0.13  
‘Poor’  > 0.0022  > 0.13  
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the Pareto Principle (McRay, 2015). Since the 
training and testing emails were from the same 
dataset, the model’s familiarity may cause it to 
produce more seemingly accurate results than it 
would on unseen data. Models may learn the details 
of the training data with such specificity that they 
cannot make more general predictive rules that can 
be applied to new datasets, in an issue known as 
‘overfitting’ (Dietterich, 1995). Due to the use of the 
same dataset for training and testing, the results of 
this study may suggest that the model is more 
accurate than it would be in a practical setting. 
The dataset’s quality may have been negatively 
impacted by the methods used to collect data or 
issues with the existing corpora. The Fraud Email 
Dataset (Verma, 2018) used as part of the training 
dataset contained some email metadata such as the 
date and time that emails were sent and encoded 
text for use with older email servers. This data was 
not valuable for training and may have caused the 
ML model to overfit or fail to identify words and 
phrases correctly. The dataset also had a lack of 
variety of legitimate emails; as the legitimate emails 
used all came from the released dataset of Hillary 
Clinton’s emails (Kaggle, 2019), they may not have 
been reflective of the average email user’s inbox.  
When using the Python Reddit API Wrapper to 
extract comments from a Reddit thread of extortion 
emails (EugeneBYMCMB, 2019), some unrelated 
comments were extracted and added to the dataset. 
This was due to the thread containing general 
comments from users introducing or discussing the 
emails shared. Also, the OCR technology used to 
extract text from images of phishing emails may 
have produced inaccurate results due to an inability 
to understand stylised text or navigate unusual text 
layouts. The presence of text added to images to 
highlight common signs of phishing attacks may also 
have been picked up by OCR technology. 
5.2 User acceptance 
Considering the SUS adjective ratings proposed by 
Bangor et al. (2009), the SUS score of 87.5 given to 
the extension can be described as ‘excellent’, and 
highlights that the extension met its aim of being a 
usable security tool. 
Participants reported that they found the extension 
easy to use and understand. One participant 
suggested that users would be more likely to keep 
using MailTrout due to the extension’s accessibility 
and embedded nature.  
- “I like how easy it is to use, it's always in the 
corner so it isn't a complicated process that 
people will give up on easily”  
Participants also remarked how impressed they 
were with the speed and ability of the extension.  
- “There are certain things in the tone of an 
email that I would not have flagged had it not 
been for the extension”  
- “I was amazed by how quickly [the 
extension] could analyse whether [an email] 
was a phishing email or not”  
Commenting on the design and layout of the 
extension, one participant with strong colour vision 
deficiency (CVD) reported the colour scheme 
provided a high level of contrast and therefore had 
no issues using it. Other participants with specific 
learning difficulties (SpLDs) found the extension 
accessibly designed with a simple layout, colour-
coding, and succinct information.  
- “I am extremely colour blind (strong 
deuteranopia) and had absolutely no issues 
using the web extension and found each 
colour to clearly stand out from its 
surroundings”  
- “I have dyslexia which makes using 
some text-based extensions difficult, this 
extension and the colour coded nature of the 
help box layout made it very accessible to 
use. Additionally the lists of what to look out 
for were to the point and easy to 
understand” 
Participants also suggested that the extension could 
educate people on identifying phishing emails 
themselves, reporting that the information on what 
to look out for, what to do and what not to do was a 
particularly good feature.  
- “The Look Out/Do/Don't is a really 
good feature, as the user is learning as they 
use [the extension] rather than just relying 
on a traffic light system.”  
The responses to each statement in the SUS survey 
were very positive overall, generally averaging 
between ‘Agree’ (4) and ‘Strongly Agree’ (5). 
However, the average response to the first 
statement was found to be lower than that of all 
others. The first statement read “I think that I would 
like to use this extension frequently”.  
A possible explanation is that while participants 
provided positive feedback on the extension overall, 
they did not feel that they needed it themselves due 
to their ability to identify phishing emails unaided. 
This can be understood further using the theory of 
diffusion of innovations (DOI), which explores how 
new ideas and technologies are adopted. One of the 
characteristics of an innovation is its ‘relative 
advantage’, meaning the degree to which the 
innovation is perceived as better in comparison to 
existing measures. If a user perceives the relative 
advantage of an innovation as low, they will be less 
likely to adopt it (Rogers, 2003). Therefore, if 
participants believed they were able to identify 
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phishing emails themselves with high levels of 
accuracy, they may have felt the relative advantage 
of using the extension was low. Therefore they felt 
less likely to adopt the practice of using the 
extension. 
Participants’ ratings of their ability to spot phishing 
emails (where 1 is poor and 5 is excellent) were 
compared to their answers for SUS statement 1 to 
understand this finding further. As hypothesised, 
participants who answered that they would not use 
the extension frequently reported they had a strong 
ability to spot phishing emails, suggesting that they 
would find using the extension unnecessary.  
Another characteristic of innovation is ‘observability’, 
meaning the degree to which the effects of the 
innovation are visible. If a user perceives the visible 
results of innovation as low, they will be less likely to 
adopt it (Rogers, 2003).  
In DOI theory, ‘preventative innovations’ aim to 
lower the probability of an unwanted future event. 
Preventative innovations tend to take longer to be 
adopted by users due to the lack of observable 
impact of their use. However, if a user experiences 
a ‘cue-to-action’ – an event that causes them to 
undergo a behavioural change – then this can result 
in a more favourable attitude towards an innovation 
(Xiao, et al., 2014).  
Security tools such as MailTrout may be considered 
preventative innovations as they aim to lower the 
probability of security failures, such as a user falling 
victim to phishing emails. Therefore, users may be 
more likely to adopt the extension if they have 
experienced a cue-to-action, such as becoming the 
victim of a phishing attack.  
Participants were shown to have an increased 
understanding of types of phishing email after using 
the extension. Average familiarity ratings for each 
phishing email category increased as participants 
used the extension to learn what to look for in 
phishing emails. These findings demonstrate the 
extension’s ability to educate users about identifying 
phishing emails in the long term. 
The results also demonstrated a correlation 
between a participant’s SUS rating and their 
demographic characteristics. Firstly, participants 
studying or working in a formal sciences subject, 
such as computing science, found the extension 
more usable than those in other subject areas. 
A potential explanation for this result may be that 
those employed in formal science fields are more 
frequent users of computers and are therefore more 
comfortable learning how to use new tools. 
Participants in formal sciences may have had more 
experience, specifically with web browser 
extensions and would find learning to use the 
extension far less challenging than someone who 
has never used a browser extension before. They 
may also have had more exposure to phishing 
emails, especially if they are involved in 
cybersecurity, which may also have given them an 
advantage over users who are less familiar with the 
terms and techniques often associated with email 
phishing. Participants in formal sciences 
demonstrated an overall higher familiarity with 
categories of phishing emails than those in other 
fields throughout the experiment. 
However, it is important to note that the average 
SUS scores of each subject field were all in the 
‘excellent’ category. Hence, differences between 
subject fields are a minor concern.   
Younger participants found the extension more 
usable than older participants. The average SUS 
scores of the 18-24 and 25-39 age ranges were in 
the ‘excellent’ category, while that of the 40-69 range 
was in the ‘good’ category. While these ratings are 
positive, it demonstrates that older participants 
found the tool less usable.     
A potential reason for this may be that participants 
who were born after the 1980s – commonly referred 
to as ‘digital natives’ – are more likely to have grown 
up around digital technology and so have been 
familiar with computers from an early age. However, 
users born before the 1980s – commonly referred to 
as ‘digital immigrants’ – grew up before the 
widespread use of digital technology and have not 
had the same experience, thus making it harder for 
them to learn how to use new technologies 
(Prensky, 2001). Younger participants may also 
have had more experience using browser 
extensions and dealing with phishing emails - this 
group demonstrated an overall higher familiarity with 
categories of phishing emails throughout the 
experiment than older participants..  
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The research showed that due to the presence of 
common words and sentiment patterns across 
phishing emails, and the ability of ML algorithms to 
classify data by detecting recurring patterns, ML 
technology is well-suited to the task of identifying 
phishing emails. Additionally, the web browser 
extension format provided a suitable way to create 
an embedded learning tool, providing users with an 
opportunity to use the extension while completing 
everyday tasks, such as checking their emails. The 
extension demonstrated high levels of accuracy 
when detecting phishing emails and high levels of 
usability. 
These findings also indicate that browser extensions 
can act as accessible security tools, requiring limited 
technical knowledge to use and can easily be 
incorporated within a person’s routine online 
activities. Due to their simplicity and embedded 
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nature, browser extensions may be beneficial for 
those with less experience of using the internet.  
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a fundamental 
shift in our lives, heightening the pace at which 
society adopts and utilises digital technologies. 
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